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Health Care Antitrust: Are Courts Adapting to a
Complex and Dynamic Industry or Are They Making
Exceptions?
Paul Wong & Lawrence Wu*
Do courts inconsistently apply antitrust laws when it comes to health
care? Is health care afforded a “pass” that has not been afforded to
other industries? These are questions to which Professor Spencer Waller
answered with a strong “yes” in his article, How Much of Health Care
Antitrust Is Really Antitrust?, and has offered several examples from case
law on group boycotts, price-fixing schemes, and hospital industry
consolidation to support his conclusion.
This Article offers a comment to Professor Waller’s observations:
antitrust law has had, and should continue to have, an important role in
protecting competition in health care markets. To explain lower court
decisions that are seemingly inconsistent with case law in other
industries, Professor Waller suggests that courts give health care
providers a de facto exemption. But this Article offers a simpler
explanation: antitrust cases often rest on facts specific to the allegation,
the competitors involved, and the market at issue, and this is perhaps
truer in health care than it is in other industries. It is not that courts have
given health care providers a pass; it is simply that the complexities of
the health care industry, coupled with the legal and economic analyses
in these cases, often expose specific facts that can make a great difference
to a given outcome. This Article revisits the examples offered by
Professor Waller and offers an optimistic outlook for health care
antitrust. Courts are armed with the ability to consider the many case* Paul Wong, Ph.D., is an economist and Senior Consultant in the Los Angeles office of NERA
Economic Consulting. Lawrence Wu, Ph.D., is an economist and president of NERA Economic
Consulting and in NERA’s San Francisco office. We thank the editors of this volume for their hard
work and helpful comments, and we thank Kate Zitelli for her assistance with our research. We
also are grateful to have received comments on an earlier draft from Lisl Dunlop, Robert F.
Leibenluft, Thomas McCarthy, Leigh Oliver, Subbu Ramanarayanan, and Douglas Ross. This
Article was prepared for a conference on competition and consumer protection in health care, and
we thank the American Bar Association’s Antitrust Section and the Loyola University Chicago
School of Law for sponsoring that program. We benefited from several thoughtful discussions with
Spencer Weber Waller and Roxane Busey and the comments and questions we received from
conference participants.
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and time-specific facts that the health care industry presents, and
antitrust enforcement in health care can continue to be effective in the
future.
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INTRODUCTION
Antitrust theory and law is founded on a simple principle: competition
ensures that goods and services are provided at low prices and high
quality. This is true for the United States health care system, just as it is
for any other industry. Yet some question whether courts effectively
exempt health care providers from antitrust laws, which has subsequently
restricted competition, the very thing antitrust laws are meant to protect.
Though courts have varied their antitrust decisions in health care over
time, there is no trend toward exceptionalism merely because the cases
“touch” health care. Rather, health care antitrust cases rest on factspecific analyses, and courts inevitably must consider the unique and
varied characteristics of the health care industry.
In his symposium article, however, Professor Waller argues that courts
give health care providers an antitrust “pass” and treat the health care
differently than any other industry. Professor Waller states:
[K]ey health care antitrust issues enjoy a de facto exemption from the
traditional antitrust doctrine. Despite a fairly faithful Supreme Court,
the law just does not seem to stick, particularly in the lower courts
which time after time accept arguments and defenses that simply do not
hold water in other contexts . . . .
When the law in action does not match the law on the books, something
has to give. The antitrust laws have served us well and rejected virtually
all forms of the special snowflake defense that health care providers
routinely offer. If the actual or perceived needs of the health care
industry are to prevail over our national commitment to market
competition then so be it. But such a dramatic shift should occur only
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if that decision is made in a fundamentally democratic and open fashion
and not on the sly in the lower courts.1

This Article presents an alternative view of antitrust in health care. If
it appears that courts lack uniformity, it is not due to logical or legal
inconsistency. Instead, it is much more likely that the nature of the health
care industry creates specific circumstances and economic issues that
vary considerably from one case to the next. Differences in judicial
decisions reflect this complicated reality and likely demonstrate careful
evaluation of specific facts on a case-by-case basis.
This Article is not an effort to enumerate each and every way in which
the health care industry varies or is potentially different from other
industries. Nor is it an effort to rationalize each and every decision in the
case law. And further, it is not an appeal to regulators, courts, and
legislators to carve out new or increased exceptions for the industry.
Rather, this Article seeks to point out an important tension in the health
care industry: there has been (and continues to be) ambiguity in how
patients and health care payors define the price, quality, and “output” of
health care services.2 As technology and medical practices change, and
as health care providers and payors move their organizations toward
providing value-based care, case-specific facts concerning price, quality,
and output become even more important. Regulators and courts tasked
with assessing a proposed transaction or a given contractual arrangement
have faced complex issues in their attempt to define the price, quality,
and output of health care services in the relevant markets. Being aware
of the ongoing complexity and dynamism in the health care industry is
critical to understanding much of the seemingly inconsistent variation in
the application of antitrust law to health care described in Professor
Waller’s article.
Part I of this Article begins by describing why there is so much
ambiguity in the health care industry and, at times, conflicting definitions.
For example, varying definitions of price, quality, and output necessarily
make an antitrust analysis in the health care industry turn on very casespecific facts. Part II of this Article walks through some of Professor
Waller’s illustrations and suggests how they highlight the complexities
of the industry, as well as efforts by regulators and courts to grapple
diligently with the details and nuances of specific cases. Part III of this
Article concludes with a discussion of the future—acknowledging that
1. Spencer Weber Waller, How Much of Health Care Antitrust Is Really Antitrust?, 48 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. (forthcoming May 2017).
2. As is explained, “output” is often a large basket of outcomes, such as both prolonged health
and quality of life. These outcomes can be conflicting, and different parties may not agree on the
priority of these outcomes.
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medical science and health care economics continue to evolve quickly. It
is clear there is a need for regulation to keep up with this evolution and
for it be tailored to the realities of the health care industry, but one can
nonetheless be optimistic about the continued place for existing antitrust
laws in the industry.
I. IS HEALTH CARE DIFFERENT?
Health care is different from other industries. The literature cites a
bevy of reasons for this conclusion, including the role of third-party and
government payors, institutional complexity, uncertainty and risk,
asymmetric information, and vertical relationships at various levels of the
delivery system.3 Compared to any given industry, some of these may
be features that distinguish health care from other industries and, in
combination, these features are generally sufficient to set health care
apart entirely. This Article is, nevertheless, a bit more agnostic about the
specific question: Is health care any different? Virtually every industry
or market is “unique” in some way, and determining whether health care
is wholly different from other industries is not a particularly productive
undertaking. It is more useful to simply acknowledge and parse through
the complexities inherent in the health care industry.
This is to say, health care is certainly complex, and it is often difficult
to discern what it means to provide “good” health care. In health care,
yes, it is socially optimal (i.e., procompetitive, proconsumer) for a firm
to produce more output at a lower price, but frequently, this must be
balanced with a large basket of other desired outcomes.4 These many
3. See, e.g., Ernst R. Berndt et al., Medical Care Prices and Output, in HANDBOOK OF HEALTH
ECONOMICS 119, 122 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000) (“A number of
conceptual difficulties and institutional characteristics of medical care markets, however, make
reliable price measurement of medical goods and services particularly difficult and challenging.”);
David Dranove & Mark A. Satterthwaite, The Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets, in
HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, supra, at 1093, 1096 (“No other market of substantial
importance violates these three requirements of perfect competition so radically. This justifies the
often-made claim that the health care market is ‘different.’”); LISA POTETZ ET AL., MEDICARE
SPENDING AND FINANCING: A PRIMER (2011) (noting that Medicare covers 55 million people and
is 14 percent of the federal budget); Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of
Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 948 (1963) (“This section will list selectively some
characteristics of medical care market . . . taken together, they do establish a special place for
medical care in economic analysis.”).
4. In general, lower prices, higher quality, and more output are associated with increases in
consumer welfare and, therefore, these metrics are often used to assess whether a proposed
transaction or contractual relationship has led to either an anticompetitive outcome or a
procompetitive, proconsumer outcome. The question is more nuanced in health care antitrust cases.
For example, a commonly cited health care policy goal is cost containment. The premise is that
“too much” money is being spent on the provision of health care services or that the dollars spent
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outcomes are woven together, possibly at competing angles, creating
complexities that might affect the issues common to antitrust analysis.
Some examples of how complexity and ambiguity arise and grate against
some basic economic issues—many of which have direct implications for
antitrust analysis, enforcement, and regulation—include:
 In many contexts, very little is known about the human body and
the way it works, which leads to uncertainty over whether more
medical treatment is better than less medical treatment.5 Hence,
it is not always the case that more “output” is better in health care.
 Technology continues to improve access to care by enabling
medical treatment to be provided in many types of facilities, but
the industry still lacks consensus on what types of patients are
best treated in certain ways and in what types of facilities is care
optimized.6 Not every patient needs to receive medical care at a
hospital, yet many are treated at hospitals; and not every
hospitalized patient needs to be treated at an academic medical
center, yet many choose to do so. Such considerations complicate
the nature of competition among providers.
 There are differing views about the importance of long- and
short-run outcomes from medical treatment, such as the use of
more aggressive treatment versus less aggressive treatment and
the repercussions for quality of life.7 Depending on the issue at
on health care services could be spent more efficiently. This premise, however, runs counter to the
general premise in antitrust law that more output (i.e., the provision of more health care services at
the same price and quality) is better than less output.
5. For example, in some situations achieving the optimal medical, societal, and proconsumer
outcomes may actually necessitate reducing the amount of care provided (i.e., restrict output),
something generally considered bad under traditional antitrust theory. See Deborah Grady & Rita
F. Redberg, Less Is More: How Less Health Care Can Result in Better Health, 170 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 749, 749 (2010) (“In fact, the opposite is true—some measures of health are worse
in areas where people receive more health services.”); Tammy C. Hoffmann & Chris Del Mar,
Patients’ Expectations of the Benefits and Harms of Treatments, Screening, and Tests: A Systematic
Review, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 274, 274 (2015) (“The majority of participants overestimated
intervention benefit and underestimated harm.”).
6. For example, the literature is mixed as to whether academic medical centers provide higher
quality care. See John Z. Ayanian & Joel S. Weissman, Teaching Hospitals and Quality of Care:
A Review of the Literature, 80 MILBANK Q. 569, 588 (2002) (“[M]ajor teaching hospitals generally
offer better care than do nonteaching hospitals.”); Ashish K. Jha et al., Care in U.S. Hospitals—the
Hospital Quality Alliance Program, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 265, 271 (2005) (“[A]cademic
hospitals had higher performance scores for acute myocardial infarction . . . but lower scores for
pneumonia.”).
7. For example, society may disagree about the appropriate balance between aggressive cancer
treatment and quality of life. It may be optimal from the standpoint of an insurer or medical
provider to aggressively treat a patient, thereby minimizing the risk of more costly treatments in
the future or prolonging the patient’s life. But from the perspective of the individual patient, the
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hand, the fact that different treatment protocols could lead to
different quality of life outcomes (each with its own benefits)
may act as a factor when comparing health care prices and quality
across providers. The introduction of a technology that produces
higher quality—such as less pain, a fuller restoration of health, or
quicker recoveries—may lead a provider to charge higher prices.
 Various aspects of medical care delivery may interact in unknown
or unpredictable ways that could affect health outcomes or the
overall coordination of care that is required to provide effective
treatment.8 But this recognition, in turn, has implications for the
way health care providers are organized.
The abovementioned examples, combined with the many institutional
and economic features of health care (i.e., the presence of government
payors, uncertainty and risk, asymmetric information, etc.) breeds
immense complexity and variation in contracting relationships (between
providers, between providers and payors, and between patients and
providers), firm structures, and incentives facing the many actors in
health care markets. Trade regulation of the health care industry, whether
through enforcement of antitrust law or by other legislation, must as fully
as possible account for this complexity and variation.
To be clear, however, this Article does not argue that the complexity
somehow leaves health care exempt from the “background rules” that
antitrust law is meant to provide.9 As Professor Waller rightly observes,
an industry is not exempt from normal antitrust law simply on account of
complexity, technology, or importance. Rather, complexity merely
makes it difficult to assess from a macro perspective whether courts are
uniformly applying antitrust law without knowing many more details
medically optimal treatment may degrade quality of life so as to be undesirable from his or her
perspective. See Jane C. Weeks et al., Relationship Between Cancer Patients’ Predictions of
Prognosis and Their Treatment Preferences, 279 JAMA 1709, 1709 (1998) (“Patients with
metastatic colon and lung cancer overestimate their survival probabilities and these estimates may
influence their preferences about medical therapies.”); Julia J. van Tol-Geerdink et al., Do Patients
with Localized Prostate Cancer Treatment Really Want More Aggressive Treatment?, 24 J.
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 4581, 4581 (2006) (“Our findings indicate that many patients attach more
weight to specific quality-of-life aspects ([e.g.,] GI toxicity) than to improving survival.”).
8. For example, behavioral health is often an issue for people with chronic physical conditions.
See Steven L. Gortmaker et al., Chronic Conditions, Socioeconomic Risks, and Behavioral
Problems in Children and Adolescents, 85 PEDIATRICS 267, 267 (1990) (“Analyses confirmed that
chronic physical conditions were a significant risk factor for behavior problems . . . .”); Danson R.
Jones et al., Prevalence, Severity, and Co-occurrence of Chronic Physical Health Problems of
Persons with Serious Mental Illness, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1250, 1250 (2004) (studying “cooccurrence of physical illness within a representative sample of persons with serious mental
illness”).
9. Waller, supra note 1, at 3–4.
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about each case. In health care, circumstances and facts vary greatly, and
applying the same background rules in different cases can lead to
different and seemingly contradictory outcomes. One should not be so
quick to ascribe the apparent variation to misapplication of the law, when
it may be simply a result of very different case-specific facts.
This same line of thinking also applies to the use of the per se and rule
of reason standards that designate violations under the Sherman Act. A
practice “with no purpose other than to limit competition” is a per se
violation of the Sherman Act.10 The rule of reason analysis, on the other
hand, weighs the harm of a practice against its benefits and is applied in
cases in which the harm to competition is not blatantly obvious.
Identifying per se practices—those that are expected to be
unambiguously bad, from which no good can come—requires at least
tepid agreement on the socially optimal outcomes and the ways the
practices in question have prevented these outcomes. In health care,
however, the legal, medical and economic communities do not agree on
what is unambiguously bad (or good), which, in many cases, has led to
an emphasis on the rule of reason analysis. Thus, a lack of per se
determinations in health care antitrust cases may simply reflect
acknowledgement of the many cost-benefit tradeoffs that arise due to the
complexity of the organizations and institutions that shape the way
patients receive medical care. Part II discusses group boycotts and price
fixing, which are two examples of these cost-benefit tradeoffs and
illustrate the courts’ reluctance to find per se violations.11 Part II also
discusses the fact-specific nature of the antitrust analyses performed in
hospital merger litigations.
II. EXAMPLES OF HEALTH CARE ANTITRUST AT WORK
Variation in lower courts’ rulings and their reliance on rule of reason
are merely byproducts of evolution and complexities in the health care
industry—these are not symptoms of health care exceptionalism. This
Part makes this case by revisiting three of the examples cited by Professor
Waller: (1) group boycotts; (2) price-fixing schemes; and (3) hospital
industry consolidation. In the first two examples, the rarity of per se
rulings and a mix of decisions (both for and against the alleged
10. United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 193–94 (2d Cir. 2016).
11. To preview the arguments below, Professor Waller argues that group boycotts (two or more
parties agreeing to jointly boycott another party) and price fixing (two or more parties agreeing to
a price outside of a competitive setting) are blatant forms of collusion; hence, they are per se
violations. Waller, supra note 1. In the next section, it is argued that it is difficult to determine if
behavior in the health care industry matches these practices; hence, courts are reluctant to rely on
the per se rule.
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conspirators) likely reflect careful consideration of the facts and
appropriate use of the rule of reason by the courts. In some instances, the
courts are following the evolution of medical and economic thought and
are responding accordingly; in other instances, the courts are without
consensus over what is optimal for the market or for patients and are
responding accordingly. In the third example—hospital industry
consolidation—the history of hospital merger litigation is not one of
inconsistency and “lawless” behavior by the courts, but rather reflects
developments in medicine and economic knowledge.
A. Group Boycotts
In Professor Waller’s view, any decision by a group of “competing”
physicians to exclude another physician (from a hospital, group practice,
or other organization) would be a group boycott.12 Early on, the courts
treated these as per se violations, but later, the courts turned to the rule of
reason as their preferred standard for evaluating these claims.13 The
courts’ maneuvers more or less disregarded established case law, creating
a tide of opinions that eventually compelled the United States Supreme
Court to agree that these cases should be judged by rule of reason.14
Rather than lawlessness, this history is illustrative of careful
enforcement of antitrust law in health care. Health care antitrust is not an
area of the law where a minority set of opinions have overturned wellaccepted antitrust rules, thereby allowing the occurrence of obvious
violations of the law. Rather, the law in this area reflects how economic
thought and the practice of medicine have evolved and become more
complex, and how the courts have adapted to consider and account for
these changes. For a specific example, a hospital might restrict its
radiology department to a single radiology group, which prohibits
independent radiologists from working there. The hospital’s decision is
not necessarily an anticompetitive conspiracy—it could simply reflect the
hospital’s desire to guarantee coverage and the efficient use of its imaging
equipment by holding a single group accountable. Moreover, the hospital
may be reacting to a shift toward value-based care or rigorous
competition from a nearby independent imaging facility, which are both
socially desirable outcomes of a dynamic, competitive process. The
move toward rule of reason is an affirmation of this sort of complexity
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984)). Professor Waller points
out that this ruling still specifies a per se decision, albeit a peculiar one. Still, as he also observes,
this per se rule requires additional inquiry that amounts to essentially a rule of reason treatment.
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that is commonplace in the health care industry. There is no reason to
view this as an abandonment of antitrust law or its respective principles.15
As the health care industry evolves, the way physicians and other
health care providers practice medicine, and the methods that measure
their performance are changing rapidly and significantly. Some
important changes that already occurred include:
 The practice of medicine becomes more complicated as society’s
understanding of the body progresses.16
 Physicians are increasingly specialized now that new techniques
exist.17
 It is now understood that there are pitfalls to evaluating
performance by rigid numeric measures, such as simply counting
deaths during surgery or rates of readmission at hospitals.18
 There is a continued movement to emphasize more subjective
measures of performance, such as patient satisfaction.19
 Health plans and hospital systems are focusing on ways to
15. Again, acknowledging and weighing the complexity of the facts within a given case is not
the same as making exceptions because of the presence of complexity. This Article agrees with
Professor Waller on the latter: industries should not be exempt from the antitrust laws simply
because of complexity. But in the area of health care, a determination of antitrust liability is likely
to depend greatly on the specific facts of the case.
16. For example, “precision medicine” now allows physicians to target treatments at the genetic
level, going beyond what was possible even ten years ago. Francis S. Collins & Harold Varmus, A
New Initiative on Precision Medicine, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 793, 794 (2015); J. Larry Jameson
& Dan L. Longo, Precision Medicine—Personalized, Problematic, and Promising, 372 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 2229, 2230 (2015).
17. See Rosemary Stevens, Trends in Medical Specialization in the United States, 8 INQUIRY 9,
9 (1971) (“Technological excellence presses toward increasing specialization . . . .”); see also
GEORGE WEISZ, DIVIDE AND CONQUER: A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF MEDICAL SPECIALIZATION
3 (2006) (chronicling the history of physician specialization over the last three centuries); ASSOC.
OF AM. MED. COLLS., THE ROAD TO BECOMING A DOCTOR, https://www.aamc.org/download/
68806/data/road-doctor.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (noting that residency and fellowship
training can exceed seven years after graduation, indicating the depth of specialization some areas
require).
18. See, e.g., Ryan P. Merkow et al., Underlying Reasons Associated with Hospital Readmission
Following Surgery in the United States, 313 JAMA 483, 483 (2015) (noting that readmission rates
are associated with post-discharge complications); J. William Thomas & Timothy P. Hofer,
Accuracy of Risk-Adjusted Mortality Rate as a Measure of Hospital Quality of Care, 37 MED. CARE
83, 83 (1999) (“Reports that measure quality using risk-adjusted mortality rates misinform the
public about hospital performance.”).
19. See, e.g., Paul Dolan, The Measurement of Health-Related Quality of Life for Use in
Resource Allocation Decisions in Health Care, in HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, supra note
3, at 1723, 1727 (“[T]he role that individual preferences should play in determining priorities in
health and elsewhere is a matter of intense debate . . . .”); Paul G. Ramsey et al., Use of Peer Ratings
to Evaluate Physician Performance, 269 JAMA 1655, 1659 (1993) (“[P]eer ratings provide a
practical method to assess clinical performance in areas such as humanistic qualities and
communication skills that are difficult to assess with other measures.”).
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provide value-based health care, which will require providers to
bear more risk and collaborate more frequently.
These changes shifted the way physician markets operate and the way
health care providers are organized. First, the importance of peer review,
clinical integration, and physician coordination continues to increase.
Second, and closely related, it is increasingly important to involve
physicians and obtain physicians’ input to run an effective health care
organization (such as a hospital), making it difficult to disentangle the
organization’s decisions from those of the physicians.
In light of those factors, it is inappropriate to rely on a per se standard
for many alleged group boycotts. It cannot be enough for a plaintiff to
simply establish that a physician was excluded from an organization that
included other physicians to call it a per se violation. Due to the
complicated realities that surround the health care industry, gathering the
facts and subsequently understanding their implications requires one to
peel back the layers of the “antitrust onion.” This process typically
reveals a fairly extensive set of questions and issues, which is consistent
with what is expected in cases subject to a rule of reason standard. For
example, a seemingly innocuous question such as “are the physicians, in
fact, competitors?” easily leads one down the rabbit hole of antitrust
market definition, because relevant markets for physicians are often very
difficult to define.20 Or another question—“what was the nature of the
involvement of the allegedly competing physicians?”—can spiral into a
long digression about performance measurement and the structure of the
organization in question.21 And a question such as “is the real dispute
between different physicians or between physicians and a hospital (or
payor)?” raises inquiries about whether the violation is horizontal or
vertical in nature.22
As the courts recognized the increasing complexity in the health care
industry and the evolution of economic thought on the topic, they, in turn,

20. For example, suppose an orthopedic surgeon was excluded from a specialty hospital that
was jointly owned by her and ten other independent orthopedic surgeons. As their titles suggest,
they all have similar training in the musculoskeletal systems of the body, yet in practice, they may
be very different, each focusing on a different subspecialty (e.g., hands, shoulders, ankles, spines,
etc.). Without more extensive inquiry (or formal market definition), it may be difficult to determine
if the physicians are competitors in the context of an antitrust inquiry.
21. For example, if peer reviews from competitors are one of many factors that decide
performance or competitors are only a small minority of voting physicians, it may be unclear if the
conspiracy is enforceable. Delving into the specifics of the case is inherently a detailed exercise.
22. United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 179 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Vertical restraints
‘are generally judged under the rule of reason.’”) (citing Anderson News, LLC v. Am. Media, Inc.,
680 F.3d 162, 183 (2d Cir. 2012)).
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recognized that the alleged “group boycotts” were not really attempts to
fix prices or to eliminate a competitor, but rather efforts to better organize
and coordinate health care delivery.23 Analyzing the details of these
many factors requires a fact-intensive rule of reason inquiry, and the
move toward rule of reason treatment of alleged group boycotts was not
simply on a judicial whim; it was because changes in medical technology,
market conditions, organizational structure, and economic thought led
courts to appreciate the complexity of the inquiry.
Perhaps further to the point, simply observing that courts evolved their
standard does not imply that courts then abandoned applicable antitrust
principles when analyzing physician markets (or health care more
broadly), or that the courts created socially undesirable outcomes. Most
physician markets are competitive and regulators are generally focused
on hospital and health plan market concentration, and less so on physician
market concentration.24 Moreover, antitrust law is still being used
successfully to prevent practices similar to those in question. For
example, one needs to look no further than a recent landmark case, North
Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, in which the Supreme Court
ruled that the State’s dental board, comprising a group of physicians,
could not join together (i.e., act as a group) and hide behind state action
immunity simply to foreclose and exclude competing providers (i.e.,
dental assistants).25 In sum, the courts’ track record concerning group
boycotts in health care is not one of inconsistency, nor is there evidence
that health care markets are worse off as a result. Rather, the courts’
decisions continue to evolve sensibly and their history indicates diligent
application of antitrust law in a complex industry.
B. Price Fixing
Professor Waller argues that separate, independent physicians’ efforts
to contract together (or otherwise jointly determine prices for their
23. See, e.g., Phillip A. Proger, Mergers, Virtual Mergers and Consolidation: Hot Business and
Transactional Issues, AHLA SEMINAR MATERIALS (1997) (citing Todorov v. DCH Healthcare
Auth., 921 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1991)) (“The hospital contended that it denied plaintiff’s
application to administer CT scans to preserve the efficient operation of the radiology department
and thereby maintain the competitiveness of the hospital.”).
24. See, e.g., Martin Gaynor & William B. Vogt, Antitrust and Competition in Health Care
Markets, in HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, supra note 3, at 1405, 1407 (“Our focus is mainly
on hospitals and interactions between hospitals and insurers. This is due, in part, to where there
has been antitrust activity. Physician markets have been for the most part very unconcentrated, and
as such have not lent themselves to the kinds of anti-competitive conduct the antitrust laws
prohibit.”); Martin Gaynor et al., The Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets, 53 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 235, 240 (2015) (“The market for physician services is generally unconcentrated.”).
25. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1117 (2015).
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services) should be viewed as price-fixing schemes and are, therefore, per
se unlawful.26 In his view, price-fixing schemes occur far too often, and
the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) (and perhaps the courts,
too) is reluctant to treat these as criminal, rather than civil, violations.
Changes in the health care industry have necessitated greater clinical
and financial integration, and these changes have raised a number of
important antitrust questions. One of the more important questions is: Is
joint price setting required to achieve the desired level of clinical
integration? As with alleged physician group boycotts, the many
complexities of the health care industry make it difficult to determine
what constitutes clinical and financial integration in health care and
whether joint price setting is or was necessary. For example, negotiations
over physician reimbursements became more complicated as payor
contracting moved from indemnity to Health Maintenance Organizations
(“HMOs”) and then to Preferred Provider Organizations (“PPOs”),
leading to various forms of partial risk sharing. The spectrum between
fee-for-service and full-risk contracting will become even broader and
more complicated as providers and payors move toward other valuebased reimbursement models. Thus, it should not be a surprise that
antitrust cases involving clinical and financial integration are treated
under a rule of reason standard instead of being universally treated as per
se violations.
Consider, as an example, the progeny of the Supreme Court’s 1982
ruling in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, which found that
an agreement among competing physicians on maximum fee schedules—
which the physicians adopted to promote fee-for-service medicine and to
provide patients with an alternative to health plans—was an agreement to
fix prices and was therefore per se illegal.27 Since then, the health care
industry has experienced the development and acceptance of capitated
reimbursement models based on financial integration among groups of
physicians. More recently, there is great interest in value-based
contracting among large groups of employed and independent physicians.
As the delivery of medical care and contracting arrangements between
physicians and health plans change, the antitrust concerns change as well.
And with those changes, the analyses performed to assess the competitive
consequences of new clinical and contractual arrangements also
transform.
The key theme of the analyses, however, remains largely the same.
Antitrust inquiry continues to revolve around the following questions:
26. Waller, supra note 1.
27. Arizona. v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 356–57 (1982).
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What are the provider incentives under the contract and how much risk is
the physician group bearing? As with the questions surrounding group
boycotts, the lack of consensus on clinical standards and best practices
make these difficult questions even more challenging to answer. To
further complicate things, the variety of physician contracting and
reimbursement methods problematizes the establishment or enforcement
of bright-line tests that specify some minimally acceptable degree of
financial integration.28 Without a clear roadmap, it is difficult for
regulators to establish catchall guidelines and for the courts to establish
exemplary cases that can be used to generalize antitrust enforcement and
treatment.
For health care providers, navigating the unknown is not new, but to
expect providers to come up with solutions that do not hinge on the
specific facts and circumstances of their market is unrealistic. Instead,
the industry and the courts should expect physicians and hospitals to
respond to buyers’ demands for the delivery of low-cost, high-quality
medical care by creating new organizational structures, developing new
contracting relationships, and building on the local institutions and
facilities that currently exist. Thus, any inquiry into the anticompetitive
and procompetitive rationales for an agreement that involves clinical and
financial integration is likely to depend greatly on local market conditions
and case-specific facts. From this angle, it would appear that the
regulators’ and the courts’ approaches, which are based on a rule of
reason analysis, are appropriate.
C. Hospital Industry Consolidation
Last are Professor Waller’s views on hospital industry consolidation.
In his view, in the 1990s, the lower courts endorsed defenses of hospital
mergers that stood in clear violation of the background rules of antitrust
law.29 He believes these decisions present contradictions in the case law
and are a potential danger to future antitrust enforcement.30 Furthermore,
28. See, e.g., Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,028
(Oct. 28, 2011) (“The Agencies emphasize that [Accountable Care Organizations (“ACOs”)]
outside the safety zone may be procompetitive and legal. An ACO that does not impede the
functioning of a competitive market will not raise competitive concerns. The creation of a safety
zone reflects the view that ACOs that fall within the safety zone are highly unlikely to raise
significant competitive concerns; it does not imply that ACOs outside the safety zone necessarily
present competitive concerns.”).
29. For example, Professor Waller cites Carilion Health System’s appeal to its nonprofit status
as an example of a violation of his fourth background rule. Waller, supra note 1.
30. Id.
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Professor Waller points to recent state actions as “gauzy cloak[s]” used
to mask anticompetitive mergers and to carve out exceptions for the
health care industry.31
Judicial decisions will always be the subject of legal debate and
discussion, and the examples cited by Professor Waller do not show that
the antitrust laws are failing when it comes to health care or that there is
a systematic trend by the courts to give health care providers an antitrust
“hall pass.” There is no question that the issues arising in hospital merger
challenges evolved with changes in the understanding of health care
markets and the tools used by economists to assess potential impacts of a
proposed transaction. But legal and economic thinking has progressed
because medical delivery has developed; the benefits and cost savings
anticipated from many of the proposed transactions reflect underlying
medical and technological transformations. Also, essentially all the
mergers that United States antitrust agencies challenged in court since
2008 sought to follow a consistent (albeit, sometimes contentious) line of
thought, and, since then, the regulators have won all of these challenges.
As is argued above, changes in medical practices and economic
thought have been instrumental in driving the evolution of health care
antitrust case law. As the courts’ understanding of this complex industry
and markets evolved, the case law adapted in suit. To wit, some of the
hospital merger decisions of the 1990s that Professor Waller cites raised
legitimate economic and legal questions that were important and relevant
at the time. But with new research and study, questions from the past are
no longer asked and new questions have surfaced. For example, one of
the important issues in a 1989 case, United States v. Carilion Health
System, was the role of nonprofit ownership in tempering the incentive to
raise prices to anticompetitive levels.32 In that case, the district court
ruled in favor of the merging parties, and one of the factors that weighed
in favor of the merging parties was their nonprofit statuses.33 Since that
case was tried, there has been substantial economic research addressing
the behavior of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals.34
31. Id.
32. United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840, 846, 849 (W.D. Va. 1989), aff’d,
No. 89-2625, 1989 WL 157282 (4th Cir. Nov. 29, 1989).
33. Id.
34. See William J. Lynk, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and the Exercise of Market Power, 38
J.L. ECON. 437, 438 (1995) (examining the differences between for-profit and nonprofit hospital
statuses in relation to antitrust regulation); see also Frank A. Sloan, Not-For-Profit Ownership and
Hospital Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, supra note 3, at 1141, 1153–61; Jill R.
Horwitz, Making Profits and Providing Care: Comparing Nonprofit, For-Profit, and Government
Hospitals, 24 HEALTH AFF. 790, 790 (2005) (proposing that for-profit hospitals are more likely to
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From 1994 to 2001, the United States antitrust agencies lost every case
they brought to court. Although the specific facts of each varied, the
central debate of each was over the size of the relevant geographic
market. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the DOJ’s Antitrust
Division were unable to convince the courts of their relevant geographic
market definitions, and the courts generally agreed to the larger
geographic markets proposed by the defendants. But since 2001,
economic research has resulted in the development of new methods to
assess hospital demand and geographic market definition.35 Against the
backdrop of this body of knowledge and the government’s success in
challenging many hospital mergers since 2008, it is arguably unclear
whether courts treat hospital mergers differently under the law. Indeed,
it is possible that the antitrust vise has more recently been squeezed too
tightly.
Finally, on the issue of state action, Professor Waller points to a West
Virginia hospital merger challenged by the FTC in 2016.36 There, the
West Virginia legislature introduced legislation that could be viewed as
shielding the merging parties from antitrust scrutiny under the guise of
state action immunity.37 Professor Waller is right to raise the issue, but
state action immunity is well established in the body of antitrust law. In
some instances, active and appropriate state supervision may be lacking
or insufficient, but inadequate state oversight continues to be the subject
of antitrust review. And there are not enough examples to draw clear
conclusions about the adequacy or inadequacy of state supervision and
regulation as an alternative to antitrust enforcement in hospital merger
cases. With the FTC’s continuing and appropriate interventions on
Certificate of Public Authority (“COPA”) laws and Certificate of Need
(“CON”) regulations, the ultimate boundaries of state action are yet to be
set. As Professor Waller notes, the issue is an important one and worth
watching, but these actions are not necessarily evidence of general
decide which medical services to offer based on profitability); Barak D. Richman, Antitrust and
Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A Return to Basics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 124 (2007).
35. FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1055 (8th Cir. 1999); California v. Sutter
Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2000), amended by, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1137
(N.D. Cal. 2001). For later research, see Cory Capps et al., Competition and Market Power in
Option Demand Markets, 34 RAND J. ECON. 737, 738 (2003) (developing an index of the market
power of suppliers in option demand markets); Martin S. Gaynor et al., A Structural Approach to
Market Definition with an Application to the Hospital Industry, 61 J. INDUS. ECON. 243, 244 (2013)
(assessing market power in antitrust cases); Robert Town & Gregory Vistnes, Hospital Competition
in HMO Networks, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 733, 733–34 (2001) (framing an analysis for bargaining
relationships between hospitals and Health Maintenance Organizations (“HMOs”) under selective
contracting).
36. Waller, supra note 1.
37. Id.
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antitrust law failings and judicial error.
III. A FORK IN THE ROAD?
This Article agrees with Professor Waller that there has been evolution
in the thinking and standards applied by the courts. Although he makes
the case that the lower courts practice antitrust exceptionalism, there is
another explanation: antitrust cases in health care are complex matters,
with outcomes dependent on case-specific facts that reflect the evolution
of a dynamic health care industry. There is variation in case outcomes,
but that is the nature of rule of reason analysis, even for conduct that
might be (or has been) labeled as a group boycott or price fixing. As long
as the outcomes reflect the application of long held antitrust principles
and an appreciation of case-specific facts, one should be confident that
the outcomes reflect the healthy functioning of the courts and the
regulators in enforcing antitrust laws.
The health care industry can certainly continue to expect changes,
variation, and complexity moving forward. Medicine continues to evolve
and there will continue to be innovation in the way health care is financed
and delivered. Legal scholars and economists will have their future work
cut out for them because health care policy will continue to evolve as
well. As changes continue, industry leaders should continue to ask: How
should one think about consumer welfare in health care markets,
particularly when there are difficult issues implicated when measuring
prices, assessing quality of care and quality of life, and accounting for the
benefits of medical innovation that allow for better treatment and
improved access to care? In addition, regulatory and policy goals may
fluctuate in the future, and varying regimes might make it difficult to
adhere to long-term goals. Finally, consumer preferences continually
change—what is now popular among patients and providers may not hold
in the future.
How does the above analysis and questions affect the health care
industry’s ability to progress? In short, this Article asserts that the
industry should appreciate the notion that situation-specific factors matter
greatly in health care, which means that, appropriately, court decisions
and interpretation of antitrust law will continue to vary across markets
and over time. One should be skeptical that new regulation and
regulatory processes can handle the complexity and case-specific nature
of competition issues in health care. But the courts are well equipped to
do just this, as they are armed with the ability to consider case- and timespecific facts and to apply antitrust law with those facts in mind. The
health care industry is not at a fork in the road and it has not lost its way
when it comes to antitrust. In fact, applying antitrust in health care is the
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road that has always been traveled, and with the right antitrust principles
in hand to lead the way, the industry will continue to move forward, not
backward.

